In cybercrimes pertaining to networking, forensics activities and user privacy rights are often competing forces. Lightweight forensics tools are needed to provide a first line of warning without infringing on user privacy. C ybercrime is on the rise, yet network forensics still struggles with the problem of identifying misdemeanors without compromising innocent users' privacy. In fact, although looking into a user's data stream may, in some cases, provide incriminating information, in most countries, it is illegal without an explicit warrant. Moreover, recent studies on digital forensics cite several challenges, including the lack of effective instant anomaly-detection tools, that deprive forensic analysts of the tools from initial leads that are vital for operations (see, e.g., Pilli et al., 1 Khan et al., 2 and Wang et al. 3 ). Hence, it is necessary to adopt a layered approach through which forensics tools that are both lightweight and privacy preserving are deployed to provide a first level of detection for suspicious behaviors.
Behavioral-Anomaly Detection in Forensics Analysis
C ybercrime is on the rise, yet network forensics still struggles with the problem of identifying misdemeanors without compromising innocent users' privacy. In fact, although looking into a user's data stream may, in some cases, provide incriminating information, in most countries, it is illegal without an explicit warrant. Moreover, recent studies on digital forensics cite several challenges, including the lack of effective instant anomaly-detection tools, that deprive forensic analysts of the tools from initial leads that are vital for operations (see, e.g., Pilli et al., 1 Khan et al., 2 and Wang et al. 3 ). Hence, it is necessary to adopt a layered approach through which forensics tools that are both lightweight and privacy preserving are deployed to provide a first level of detection for suspicious behaviors.
When such a behavior is detected, further investigation can target a limited subset of the traffic, with the twofold advantage of reducing computational requirements and, if necessary, providing the basis for the request of an actual warrant. To this end, we introduce CATTURE, a lightweight, privacy-preserving behavioral-anomaly-detection tool that assumes no prior knowledge of what constitutes an anomaly. The CATTURE investigation is based only on anonymized traffic features, and its results respect the legal constraints defined by the European Union (EU) for the publication of network traffic. Furthermore, we show how it is possible to leverage the specific knowledge and expertise of a specific site's network administrators to ground statistical signatures and statistically anomalous behaviors to specific unseasonal events and so cull out the number of false positives without reducing the sensitivity of the system and generating false negatives.
After generating packet statistical summaries in terms of a predefined set of features for all nodes observed, CATTURE generates clusters according to each feature and then aggregates together nodes with similar patterns, forming profiles. To identify malicious activities, outlier detection is deployed to single out profiles with extreme feature values (relatively speaking) and label the nodes comprising them as anomalous.
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O n e o f t h e m o s t p ro b l e m at i c a s p e c t s o f anomaly-detection solutions is their inability to cope with special events and ephemeral modifications without generating a flurry of false positives; 4, 5 at the same time, changes in behavior that are specifically dangerous or suspicious are often not treated differently from any other change, thus leading to very troublesome false negatives. For these reasons, we ground our statistical analysis to the actual meaning of events by fusing the wisdom of network experts-actually, the expertise of the system managers of the sites where our tool has been tested. In this way, we enrich our statistical anomaly-detection system with expert knowledge, reducing the frequency of both false positives and false negatives.
Related Work
Recent research on forensics analysis has applied intrusion-detection solutions to help identify malicious parties proactively. Here, we shed light on some state-ofthe-art examples, such as the network forensics system based on intrusion-detection analysis (NFIDA). 6 This system utilizes packet headers to perform offline analysis that comprises pattern matching and protocol analysis and uses library traces to identify packets that convey malicious behavior.
A hybrid attack-detection and anti-honeypotbased forensics model addressing distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks in machine-to-machine networks is depicted in Wang et al. 7 The proposed solution utilizes a decentralized intrusion-detection framework that reacts to detected threats in real time. The alert detection expert system (ADES) forensics tool performs intrusion detection, as described by Olabelurin et al. 8 ADES analyzes many logs to identify DDoS attacks proactively using a combination of the Shannon entropy concept and clustering algorithms. The offline, centralized forensics system depicted in Al-Mahrouqi et al. 9 , the admissible network forensics correlation model (ANFCM), utilizes a log-based intrusion-detection component, then applies decision-tree algorithms to filter anomalous behaviors. Afterward, the ANFCM reroutes the logs to a central repository, where event-log-management functions are applied. The fuzzy logic-based system for origin-of-attack detection (FLSOAD), described by Rostamipour and Sadeghiyan, 10 is a network forensics tool that aims to identify the origin of attack using intrusion detection; it employs an expert system based on fuzzy logic to identify the time, origin, and method of attack. Behavioral-anomaly detection is also used in network forensics with a DempsterShafer theory tool, proposed by Tian et al. 11 ; this is a decentralized digital evidence-fusion tool that utilizes efficient data-mining and reasoning-theory techniques to detect and fuse anomalous behavior from different sources in real time.
As suggested by these examples, network forensics analysis tools that use intrusion detection vary with respect to their processing style: some operate in a centralized fashion, and others are distributed. Also, their responsiveness differs: some provide real-time responses as soon as abnormalities surface, and others digest the collected information and provide feedback offline. As for the approaches that forensics tools use, they include machine-learning and information-theory techniques, among others. The end goal of a forensics tool differs as well; some tools identify the origin of an attack, whereas others aim at visualizing the attack. Also, some forensics tools reconstruct attacks, whereas others analyze intrusion data. Table 1 gives a taxonomy of network forensics tools. 
CATTURE Architecture
The cluster-based anomaly detection using SKE-TURE engine (CATTURE) is an anomaly-detection system that identifies network nodes exhibiting anomalous behavior without jeopardizing users' privacy. It also provides an understanding of the underlying network behavior by mathematically modeling the operations of the nodes comprising the designated network. To achieve its goal, CATTURE analyzes certain features of the network traffic, using the sketch-based tool SKETURE, 12 and then applies an efficient clustering technique to categorize the nodes within the network. Afterward, CATTURE uses a profiling approach to generate sets of patterns that describe the behavior of the nodes. Then, it compares these sets of patterns to identify nodes that are deviating from normal behavior. The CATTURE system comprises three modules: the packet-analysis, profiling, and anomaly-detection modules ( Figure 1 ).
Packet-Analysis Module
To model the behavior of a given node, its incoming and outgoing packets must be analyzed. As noted previously, CATTURE utilizes SKETURE, 12 the sketch-based packet analysis tool, for packet analysis. As it splits time into equal intervals, SKETURE examines the packet headers after obfuscating their address information and builds a statistical summarization of each node n's behavior in terms of a preselected set of features during each such interval. 12 In this study, we chose the following features to summarize the behavior of nodes:
■ packet size, in bytes ■ packet count ■ number of unique destinations ■ total number of bytes.
Profiling Module
The profiling module in CATTURE has two phases: clustering and reduction. The first clusters nodes according to each feature separately, and the second aggregates nodes with similar clustering across different features into profiles. In this section, we describe these two phases in detail.
Clustering
Clustering in CATTURE happens at two levels. At the first level, we cluster nodes according to how long they have been active in the network; that is, we apply duration-based clustering and label these clusters as top groups. At the second level, we cluster the nodes in each top group according to the values of their corresponding features; that is, we apply feature-based clustering.
The duration-based clustering in CATTURE creates three top groups: the short-lived top group, denoted by S; the medium-lived top group, denoted by M; and the long-lived top group, denoted by L. The S group contains the nodes that remained active for the fewest time intervals, the L group contains the nodes that were active for the most time intervals, and the remaining nodes get assigned to the M group. We chose to do this duration-based clustering before analyzing the nodes' behaviors because it is unlikely that nodes appearing sporadically will behave like nodes that are active almost all of the time.
Feature-based clustering executes for each top group separately. Thus, within each top group, CATTURE applies a divisive clustering algorithm, QUIST, 13 considering each feature separately. Using a given top group d as an initial cluster with respect to a given feature f, CATTURE calculates the overall average of node n values. Then, it sorts the set of all such values across all nodes in d. After that, it applies the QUIST spreadness metric, which estimates the scatterness of values in a set and determines whether or not the nodes in the set need to be split into further subclusters. If the spreadness value of the initial cluster exceeds a preset threshold, the cluster is split into two parts at its median. This process is repeated iteratively until each remaining cluster has fewer nodes than a predefined size s or has a spreadness value below the preset threshold. QUIST also terminates when the number of generated clusters reaches a predefined limit K, whichever happens first. After separate clusters of all features in each top group d are created, the next phase reduces the generated clusters into profiles.
Reduction Phase
In the reduction phase, CATTURE designates each cluster generated with respect to feature f, c f by an interval comprising the minimum and maximum values it contains, denoted by [min cf , max cf ]. Then, it examines the clusters to which each node belongs with respect to each feature f and creates a corresponding association that depicts each cluster to which a given node belongs with respect to each feature f. Next, all nodes with identical associations are assigned to a profile p i . However, this may generate numerous profiles; thus, CATTURE merges similar profiles. More precisely, because profiles comprise associations, profiles p i and p j are similar if their corresponding associations are similar for each feature f. Also, two associations are considered similar with respect to feature f if all respective intervals composing them are similar. Two intervals are similar if either is contained in the other or if most of their values are in common. Furthermore, if the intervals are too close to each other (that is, the distance between the two furthest endpoints of two intervals is less than or equal to a tolerance constant), then they are considered similar.
Thus, if the associations of two profiles are similar, then they are considered similar and are thus merged into a new profile containing all of the nodes that appeared in both profiles originally. The process of reducing similar profiles continues until no profiles are similar.
Anomaly-Detection Module
This module applies statistical outlier detection to isolate outlier profiles with respect to each feature f. The technique adopted is the modified z score, which uses a standardized score to measure how much a given value differs from typical values within a set of values.
We run this statistical test across all profiles within a given top group d w ith respect to a particular feature f. If a profile passes the test, we label it as normal with respect to feature f; otherwise, we label it as abnormal with respect to feature f. If a given profile is labeled normal with respect to all features f, then it is labeled as normal. Otherwise, it is labeled as potentially outlier. Consequently, nodes making up that profile are also labeled potentially malicious.
This labeling serves as a first-level alarm, but it may convey false alarms. Therefore, CATTURE checks its exception repository for exceptions as provided by the network administrator; if a profile it labeled appears with a different labeling in the repository, CATTURE fixes the label accordingly.
Administrators may also examine nodes within profiles that CATTURE labeled as outlier and provide further feedback. Upon doing so, the network administrator would either confirm the CATTURE labeling of a given potentially outlier profile or, alternatively, add that profile to CATTURE's exception repository.
Experimentation and Results
In this section, we present the data set we used for assessing CATTURE alongside the CATTURE implementation. Then, we give the preliminary results and highlight the insights obtained from domain experts.
Padua Data Set
The Padua data set consists of the traffic of the Department of Information Engineering (DEI) at the University of Padua over a month starting on 5 April 2015 and ending on 5 May 2015. 12 To perform our studies without jeopardizing users' privacy and to comply with EU regulations, our traces included only the following information per packet: ■ obfuscated Internet Protocol addresses ■ packet time stamp ■ packet length.
Although looking into a user's data stream may, in some cases, provide incriminating information, in most countries, it is illegal without an explicit warrant.
Implementation
The implementation of CATTURE is based both on the SKETURE tool described by Al-Haj Baddar et al. 12 and on an implementation of the profiling and anomaly detection modules in Java, version 8.0. SKE-TURE was first used to generate per-minute summaries for the traces collected on Monday, 27 April 2015; Friday, 1 May 2015; and Sunday, 3 May 2015. Then, the profiling module performed a first-level clustering that generated three top groups for short-lived, medium-lived, and long-lived nodes. The short-lived g r o u p s p a n n e d nodes that were alive fewer than 10 min and included most of the nodes; the medium-lived nodes were active for up to 20 min and included only 6% of the nodes observed; and the long-lived nodes were active for longer than 20 min, up to 24 h, and included approximately 15% of the nodes observed. We ran our experiments without utilizing an exception repository because, at that time, we did not have any preinsights as to what would constitute an exception.
Preliminary Results
In this section, we summarize the labeled profiles CAT-TURE generated for the traces for Monday, 27 April, which, according to the DEI network administrators, was a regular working Monday on campus. We also contrast the behavior exhibited by the network on that day with its behavior on Friday, 1 May, which was an official holiday in Italy, and with Sunday, 3 May, which was a typical weekend day. Finally, we highlight the time and memory requirements of the profiling and anomaly-detection modules in CATTURE.
Network Behavior
When comparing the number of nodes observed for three different days-Monday, 27 April; Friday, 1 May; and Sunday, 3 May-we notice that Monday had the highest number of nodes. In fact, an official holiday (1 May) and a Sunday together accounted for only 54% of the nodes observed on the Monday. On the other hand, we observed that, although Monday, 27 April, had 98 profiles, Friday, 1 May, had a comparable number of profiles (92), although it was an official holiday, while Sunday, a weekend day, had only 83 profiles. Furthermore, nodes remaining active on
Friday were almost half the number of nodes reported on Monday; however, they produced 92 different profiles. Sunday had a similar number of nodes as Friday did, yet it had fewer profiles. This indicates that network administrators probably had the nodes do some routine tasks on Friday they would not normally do on a Sunday. To provide a better understanding of how the observed nodes behaved, we now summarize the labeled profiles exhibiting normal and outlier profiles based on statistical detection, as identified by CATTURE. Although none of the reported packet sizes in the short-lived profiles on Monday was statistically abnormal, 8% of the medium-lived profiles had abnormal packet sizes, which ranged from almost 0.8 KB to almost 3 KB. Moreover, 28.2% of the long-lived nodes exhibited statistically abnormal packet sizes, ranging from approximately 0.3 KB to approximately 3.4 KB. The network administrators asserted there were no abnormalities reported that day, so we consider these statistical outliers as false positives. However, if we had had a priori knowledge of the nodes' roles, we could identify anomalies missed by the network administrators.
We now consider the statistical analysis of packet counts in relation to duration clustering. First, only 0.26% of the short-lived nodes exhibited statistically anomalous behavior in terms of packet counts, as they sent almost 8,500-140,000 packets/min. At the same time, 7.5% of the medium-lived nodes had a statistically abnormal number of packets/min, as almost 6.7% of them sent up to 6,500 packets/min and almost 0.8% of them sent up to 53,500 packets. As for long-lived nodes, only 0.7% of them exhibited statistically abnormal packet counts, reaching up to 231,000 packets/min. Again, as the network administrators stated they did not notice any abnormalities on Monday, 27 April, we will consider the CATTURE outliers as false positives. However, the existence of priori knowledge on node roles should have helped us identify stealthy anomalies not spotted by network administrators.
With reference to the number of unique destinations of packets, we observed that none of the short-lived nodes contacted more than 2,304 different destinations/min, and 36.15% of the medium-lived nodes contacted, at most, one unique destination/min. On the Analyzing the behavior over the three days with respect to packet counts, we observed that short-lived nodes sent more packets on Monday.
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other hand, 0.72% of the long-lived nodes contacted, at most, 390 unique destinations/min. As CATTURE classified the medium-lived nodes with, at most, one unique destination/min together with the long-lived nodes with more than 20 unique destinations/min as statistically anomalous, we still cannot confirm that any one of those nodes is actually anomalous unless we have further information on their position in the network and the types of tasks they were expected to do.
Statistical analysis of the total bytes transmitted by nodes clustered according to their duration shows that about 6% of short-lived nodes exhibited a statistically anomalous behavior by sending more than 0.2 MB/min and up to 33 MB/min of data. Also, almost 15% of medium-lived nodes sent more than 69 KB/min, and up to approx imately 80 MB/min of data and were flagged as statistical anomalies. As for long-lived nodes, almost 18% exhibited statistically anomalous behavior by sending more than 33 KB/min and up to approximately 342 MB/min. Network administrators would probably be interested in investigating such nodes to validate their operations when such an observation is generated by CATTURE.
We also compared the behavior exhibited by the nodes on Monday, Friday, and Sunday with respect to the maximum value reported in each association across the three days. The maximum average packet size reported on Friday and Sunday exceeded the corresponding value reported on Monday for short-lived nodes. Although the maximum average packet size reported for short-lived nodes on Monday was a bit lower than 4 KB, the maximum average packet size for short-lived nodes on Friday and Sunday reached almost 5 KB. According to the network managers, this is probably because more machine-driven automated traffic was generated on Friday and Sunday compared with Monday, when human users were around. Furthermore, although the long-lived nodes behaved almost similarly over the three days in terms of their packet sizes, the medium-lived nodes sent much smaller packets on Sunday than on Monday and Friday; on Sunday, the medium-lived nodes sent packets of no more than 1.5 KB each, as compared with Monday and Friday, when the medium-lived nodes sent packets with sizes almost twice as large.
Analyzing the behavior over the three days with respect to packet counts, we observed that short-lived nodes sent more packets on Monday; in fact, their maximum packet count reached almost 150,000 packets/ min, whereas much less activity was observed on Friday and Sunday, when packets/min did not exceed 80,000. As Monday was a working day, compared with an official holiday and a weekend day, this behavior is rather expected. However, when the medium-lived nodes are examined, a different pattern is identified. As compared with medium-lived nodes on Monday (when almost 50,000 packets/min were sent) and medium-lived nodes on Sunday (when no more than 20,000 packets/min were sent), the medium-lived nodes on Friday outdid them both by sending almost 400,000 packets/ min. This is quite interesting because Friday was an official holiday; thus, unless network administrators were running prescheduled tasks t hat wo u l d c au s e medium-lived nodes to send this many packets, this behavior implies an anomaly in 30% of these medium-lived nodes, and further investigation has been suggested.
We also compared the maximum number of unique destinations the nodes contacted per minute. In the three days we are considering, short-lived nodes contacted almost 2,200 different destinations/ min, and medium-lived nodes contacted no more than 500 unique destinations in the three days. As for the long-lived nodes, they contacted fewer than 500 unique destinations/min on Monday and almost 100 unique destinations/min on Sunday. However, although Friday was a holiday, some long-lived nodes contacted almost 1,200 unique destinations that day. Again, unless network administrators can assert that this behavior was normal, due to some prescheduled operations, one may suspect that these nodes were involved in malicious behavior, and further investigation is suggested.
Medium-lived nodes also exhibited a different-thanexpected behavior on Friday compared with Monday and Sunday. Some medium-lived nodes sent almost 600 MB/min of traffic on Friday, whereas, on Monday, they did not exceed 100 MB/min of traffic. Also, medium-lived nodes on Sunday did not send more than 4 MB/min. This further confirms our previous notes on the behavior of medium-lived nodes. As for short-lived nodes, their behavior on Monday compared with Friday and Sunday was rather expected; short-lived nodes on Monday sent up to 200 MB/min
The introduction of CATTURE allows a second level of analysis, with reduced computational and privacyinfringement requirements.
of data, but their counterparts on Sunday and Friday did not exceed 100 MB/min. As for long-lived nodes, they did not send more than 9.6 MB/min on Sunday and no more than 200 MB/min on Friday; but, as expected, they sent approximately 350 MB/min of traffic on Monday.
The outliers identified by CATTURE were considered false positives, as network administrators stated that they did not identify any malicious behavior on Monday, 27 April. Nevertheless, the number of outlier nodes CATTURE recognized was much smaller than the actual network size, and the nodes' worrisome features were clearly identified. Thus, the introduction of CATTURE allows a second level of analysis, with reduced computational and privacy-infringement requirements.
Performance of CATTURE
If CATTURE failed to raise the first-level alarm in a timely manner, malicious behavior could go unnoticed until it is too late. In our experiments, although generating labeled profiles for 28 MB of summaries required 5 s, it took almost 25 s to generate such outcomes for 168 MB of summaries. As for memory consumption, the same set of experiments showed that, although running CATTURE for 28 MB of summaries required 500 MB of random-access memory, running it for six times more input increased the memory required to only 600 MB. Hence, we conclude that the CATTURE is CPU hungry and that the computational requirements are almost linear with the amount of data processed; however, the memory consumption pattern shows a significant saturation effect.
Expert Insights and Discussion
We discussed the results and the outlier labels we obtained with the network administrators at the University of Padua. Aside from asserting that they were not aware of any abnormal behaviors on Monday, 27 April, they expressed concern about having zombie nodes in their network. They also said that having an orchestrated set of nodes that perform a designated action at a designated time is another source of concern. This may imply that the majority of the outliers identified by CATTURE (and described in this section) are false positives, but this does not eliminate the chance that some nodes were actually abnormal.
Discussion with network administrators confirmed our approach of first doing a durational clustering to generate three top groups, which they said would help them better contrast nodes' behaviors. Moreover, network administrators reemphasized the importance of tuning behavioral-anomaly-detection solutions to the environment in which they operate; otherwise, statistical outliers may become irrelevant to nodes' behavioral contexts. This tuning also helps ground normal profiles and continuously improve the exception repository.
Identifying a priori behavioral groups and generating a priori tags for each node may help ground the statistical analysis. As an example, in the DEI network, there are three main behavioral groups: personal machines of staff members, public machines for students, and servers. Among the server group, further distinction may tag computational servers differently than web-services servers. Intuitively, it is obvious that these categories are too broad to allow pinpointing of a single node in the set, thus breaching anonymity; nonetheless, to guarantee the desired level of privacy, it is possible to design the tagging so that it guarantees k-anonymity. 14 Adopting this set of a priori tags would enrich the statistical analysis performed by CATTURE.
T o provide the initial leads essential for effective investigations, forensic analysis tools need to overcome the problems of user privacy and immediate response times. For these reasons, we introduced CATTURE, a lightweight, statistical detector capable of identifying behavioral anomalies both in time and among the network node population while complying with the privacy rules of Italian law (one of the most restrictive in the EU in the field of privacy). CATTURE not only uses statistical-outlier detection to identify anomalies but also leverages domain experts' knowledge to help further refine its findings.
To evaluate the performance of CATTURE, we had it summarize and analyze the packet traces of a campus network on three days: Monday, 27 April 2015; Friday, 1 May 2015; and Sunday, 3 May 2015. After building profiles of the nodes' behaviors, we applied a statistical outlier-detection technique to identify potentially malicious nodes. We contrasted the behavior of the network on the three days and described the outliers identified; however, because the data were completely anonymized and the analysis was performed postmortem, it was not possible to carry out further investigations to identify the exact type of misdemeanor.
We then discussed the profiles and labels generated by CATTURE with network experts, who suggested that labeling the nodes with an a priori behavioral category general enough to avoid privacy infringement (e.g., a web server versus a desktop machine) could have helped identify genuinely malicious nodes. Finally, we depicted the time and memory requirements of CATTURE on data set samples of varying sizes.
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We will improve CATTURE to address a set of issues highlighted by the domain experts, such as including a calendar-themed exception repository that would allow CATTURE to recognize when certain exceptions are likely to happen. Moreover, we will introduce node tags that preassign roles to nodes a priori, to pinpoint nodes deviating from normal behavior without jeopardizing users' privacy.
